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INTRODUCTION
The “rise of China” has already become cliché among international
relations scholars and policy analysts. Yet few disagree that the People’s
Republic of China’s economic, military, and political power has reached
new heights in recent years.1 It is, therefore, surprising that relatively few
international law scholars have studied whether and, if so how, the “rise of
China” is affecting the development and growth of international law.
Take, for example, the application of the doctrine of sovereign
immunity to foreign government officials—an area of substantial ferment
and change. Numerous international authorities have suggested that, under
international law, government officials cannot invoke the protections of
sovereign immunity for acts that violate jus cogens norms. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently relied on this
international law trend, holding that the “common law of sovereign
Copyright © 2016 Julian G. Ku
* Julian G. Ku is the Maurice A. Deane Distinguished Professor of Constitutional Law at
Hofstra University in New York.
1. See, e.g., John Ikenberry, The Rise of China and the Future of the West, 87 FOREIGN AFF. 23
(2008).
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immunity” does not shield former government officials accused of acts
violating jus cogens from civil lawsuits.2 But although the Fourth Circuit
cited decisions from the United Kingdom and Italy to support its holding,3
it did not cite China’s views. This failure, while understandable, suggests
that the impact of China’s perspective on this key question of international
law remains small.
This Essay uses the Fourth Circuit’s holding as an opportunity to
consider China’s impact on the development of a complex and important
doctrine of international law. It begins by observing that China’s
government would likely oppose the jus cogens exception to sovereign
immunity recognized by the Fourth Circuit. This rejection of a jus cogens
sovereign immunity exception would not be a matter of pure political
expediency vulnerable to change with the political winds. Rather, rejecting
a jus cogens exception to sovereign immunity would be consistent with the
Chinese government’s long-standing emphasis on the importance of
sovereign equality under international law. Sovereign equality disapproves
the notion that any country’s courts can sit in judgment of another equal
sovereign. China’s commitment to this principle is reflected in its
adherence to the doctrine of absolute sovereign immunity, despite the
strong international trend to the contrary.
There are many examples of China’s insistence on a broad sovereign
immunity in U.S. courts. For instance, when Chinese government officials
have become embroiled in U.S. litigation, the Chinese government has
demanded immunity for all of its government officials, even for alleged jus
cogens violations. Indeed, in a previous U.S. case involving allegations of
jus cogens violations by a (non-head-of-state) Chinese government official,
China demanded (and received) immunity for its government official in
U.S. court.4 The Chinese government has stated in official diplomatic notes
that U.S. courts’ failure to grant such immunity would be perceived by the
Chinese government as a violation of the U.S. government’s international
law obligations.5
Although China’s views on international law have rarely influenced
international law scholars and theorists, China’s vehement opposition to
any exceptions to sovereign immunity would likely have practical
2. Yousuf v. Samantar, 699 F.3d 763, 773 (4th Cir. 2012).
3. Id. at 776.
4. See Li Weixum v. Bo Xilai, 568 F. Supp. 2d 35, 38–39 (D.D.C. 2008). The question of
immunity for jus cogens acts was not addressed, however, because the court found that Bo was immune
under diplomatic (as opposed to sovereign) immunity. See id. at 37.
5. See, e.g., Lewis S. Yelin, Head of State Immunity As Sole Executive Lawmaking, 44 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 911, 924 (2011) (describing a U.S. State Department letter stating that the Chinese
government had asked the U.S. government to act).
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significance. In a post-Samantar case against a Chinese government
official, a U.S. court endorsing a jus cogens exception would probably face
serious Chinese protest and opposition. If such a case were to arise, it
would represent a fascinating example of how China’s new importance in
world affairs affects (or perhaps does not affect) the evolution of this
doctrine in U.S. courts and elsewhere.
This Essay begins by illustrating that the Samantar litigation
reaffirmed a series of lower court decisions holding that foreign sovereign
immunity does not attach to official acts that violate jus cogens. These
decisions have been important evidence for scholars who claim that such an
exception to foreign sovereign immunity is now accepted as a rule of
customary international law. Part II then examines and describes China’s
views on sovereign immunity, arguing that China’s government will almost
certainly reject any exception to sovereign immunity for jus cogens. Finally
the Essay concludes by considering the implications of China’s rejection of
a jus cogens exception for sovereign immunity on U.S. judicial practice
post-Samantar and on international law more generally.
I. THE JUS COGENS EXCEPTION TO FOREIGN SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY
States have long granted immunity from the jurisdiction of their own
domestic courts to foreign sovereigns. Such immunity is traditionally
justified by comity and respect for foreign sovereigns, but it has also often
been understood as a requirement of customary international law.6 The
precise scope of this immunity, however, has been the subject of much
discussion and, in many cases, debate.
The scope of sovereign immunity protection afforded government
officials—as opposed to the scope of protection afforded the foreign
government itself—is one area of uncertainty. In the United States, foreign
heads of state have historically enjoyed “status-based” immunity from U.S.
jurisdiction.7 Such immunity attaches due to the beneficiary’s “status” as
head of state, and not due to the type of acts he is claiming immunity for.
Status-based immunity for heads of state has deep roots in customary
international law and has received broad acceptance around the world.
Diplomats, ambassadors, and similar high-level foreign emissaries have

6. See, e.g., 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 342 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds.,
9th ed. 1992); Dexter & Carpenter, Inc. v. Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen, 43 F.2d 705, 710 (2d Cir. 1930)
(describing sovereign immunity rules as part of the “international rule of law.”).
7. See, e.g., Chimène I. Keitner, The Common Law of Foreign Official Immunity, 14 GREEN
BAG 2D 61, 63 (2010).
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also historically enjoyed status-based immunity.8 Such status-based
immunities attach only while the head of state or diplomat holds office.
Immunity for other types of government officials, former heads of
state, and ambassadors has been less certain under international law.
Indeed, the immunity of these non-head-of-state foreign government
officials has hardly been considered in U.S. litigation for most of U.S.
history. To the extent that such officials are afforded immunity, however, it
is “conduct-based.” This means that officials can invoke immunity only for
official acts, or acts performed on behalf of the foreign state. Private acts or
acts inconsistent with the grant of permission or law of the foreign state do
not fall within this type of immunity.
In recent years, several jurisdictions around the world have recognized
an exception to immunity for foreign government officials whose “official”
acts violated jus cogens norms. Jus cogens norms are certain unusually
heinous international acts prohibited by all states.9 These jurisdictions
reasoned that the universal prohibitions contained in jus cogens norms
meant that no state could legitimately authorize its officials to violate them.
The leading authority is a decision in which a United Kingdom court lifted
a foreign government officials’s sovereign immunity protection because his
alleged acts of torture did not constitute an official act.10 Other jurisdictions
have also lifted conduct-based immunity for alleged jus cogens violations
in the criminal context.11 Some U.S. courts followed this trend, finding a
jus cogens exception to conduct-based immunity and applying the concept
in the slightly more controversial context of civil litigation.12
The Fourth Circuit’s decision in the Samantar litigation illustrates the
importance of the jus cogens exception. In Samantar, plaintiffs alleged that
a series of jus cogens violations, including torture, were committed by the
defendant, who had committed the acts while serving both as prime

8. Id. at 64.
9. M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes: 'Jus Cogens' and 'Obligatio Erga Omnes', L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1996, at 63, 68.
10. See R v. Bartle, ex Parte Pinochet [1999] UKHL 17, [2000] 1 AC 147 (HL) 203–05 (appeal
taken from Eng.) (concluding that official-acts immunity is unavailable to shield foreign officials from
prosecution for international crimes because acts of torture do not constitute officially-approved acts).
11. See Curtis A. Bradley & Laurence R. Helfer, International Law and the U.S. Common Law of
Foreign Official Immunity, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 213, 238–40 (2010).
12. See, e.g., Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193, 1209 (9th Cir. 2007) (recognizing that acts
in “violation[] of jus cogens norms . . . cannot constitute official sovereign acts”); Siderman de Blake v.
Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 718 (“International law does not recognize an act that violates jus
cogens as a sovereign act.”); Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 893 (7th Cir. 2005) (Cudahy, J.,
dissenting) (“[O]fficials receive no immunity for acts that violate international jus cogens human rights
norms (which by definition are not legally authorized acts).”).
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minister of and as a leading minister for the Somalian government.13
Defendant Samantar invoked both head-of-state and conduct-based
immunity and further argued that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
provided a statutory basis for his immunity.14 The Supreme Court rejected
Samantar’s statutory argument and remanded his case to lower courts to
determine whether he enjoyed immunity under the common law of foreign
sovereign immunity.15 On remand, both the district and appeals courts
found that Samantar could not invoke immunity.16 Although the district
court appeared to defer to the executive’s suggestion of non-immunity for
reasons of foreign relations, the Fourth Circuit squarely held that the
question of immunity was wholly judicial and largely controlled by the
customary international law of foreign sovereign immunity.17
After surveying these international law authorities, the Fourth Circuit
concluded that “[t]here has been an increasing trend in international law to
abrogate foreign official immunity for individuals who have commited
acts, otherwise attributable to the State, that violate jus cogens norms—i.e.,
they have commited international crimes or human rights violations.”18
Although the Fourth Circuit noted some contrary international authority19
on the applicability of the jus cogens exception to civil lawsuits, it
nonetheless concluded that “under international and domestic law, officials
from other countries are not entitled to foreign official immunity for jus
cogens violations, even if the acts were performed in the defendant’s
official capacity.”20 Thus, Samantar could not avail himself of immunity
and was subject to the U.S. courts’ jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court did not grant certiorari to review the Fourth
Circuit’s decision. This leaves the jus cogens exception alive and well as
part of the common law of sovereign immunity applied by at least some
U.S. courts.21 The decision also serves to further bolster the argument of
13. Yousuf v. Samantar, 552 F.3d 371, 373–74 (4th Cir. 2009).
14. Id.
15. Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 326 (2010).
16. See, e.g., Yousuf v. Samantar, No. 1:04CV01360 (LMB/JFA), 2011 WL 7445583 (E.D. Va.
Feb. 15, 2011), aff'd, 699 F.3d 763 (4th Cir. 2012).
17. Yousuf v. Samantar, 699 F.3d 763, 776 (4th Cir. 2012).
18. Id.
19. Compare Cass., sez. un., 11 marzo 2004, n. 5044, Foro it. 2004, I (It.) [Ferrini v. Republic of
Germany] (denying “the functional immunity of foreign state organs” for jus cogens violations in
criminal context), with Jones v. Saudi Arabia [2006] UKHL 26 [24], [2007] 1 AC 270 (HL) (appeal
taken from Eng.) (rejecting jus cogens exception to foreign official immunity in civil context).
20. Yousuf, 699 F.3d at 777.
21. Several circuits have held differently, holding that there is no general jus cogens exception to
sovereign immunity under customary international law. See, e.g., Matar v. Dichter, 563 F.3d 9, 14 (2d
Cir. 2009); Wei Ye v. Jiang Zemin, 383 F.3d 620, 627 (7th Cir. 2004).
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international law scholars that the jus cogens exception has achieved the
status of customary international law.
II. CHINA AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
In its survey of international authorities, the Fourth Circuit considered
Italian and British authorities on the question of a jus cogens exception for
foreign government official immunity. The Fourth Circuit did not consider
Chinese authorities—probably because no court in China had ever ruled on
the question of a jus cogens exception to sovereign immunity. Yet as I
explain below, China’s government would almost certainly reject the jus
cogens exception. This result, as I will explain in Part IV, calls into
question the correctness of Fourth Circuit’s holding as a matter of
international law.
A. China’s View on the Importance of Sovereignty
Wang Tieya, one of China’s most preeminent international law
scholars, observed that China has been the most “enthusiastic champion” of
the principle of sovereignty under international law.22 This enthusiasm
extends back to China’s announcement of its Five Principles for Peaceful
Co-Existence in 1954, which declared sovereignty and non-interference in
the domestic affairs of states to be China’s core principles of international
law.23 As then-Prime Minister of China Wen Jiabao noted in a 2008 speech
to the United Nations General Assembly,
China’s persistent stand of the primacy of State sovereignty has its deep
roots embedded in the miserable experience in its modern history. . . .
“Respect for sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of
other countries is the prerequisite for sound State-to-State relations. The
Chinese people have learned from their modern history of humiliation
that when a country loses sovereignty, its people lose dignity and
status.”24

22. Wang Tieya, International Law in China: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, 221
COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACAD. OF INT’L L. 195, 288 (1990).
23. Id. at 263. The Five Principles include: “(a) mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity
and sovereignty; (b) mutual non-aggression; (c) mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs;
(d) equality and mutual benefit; (e) peaceful co-existence.” Id.
24. Xue Hanqin, Chinese Contemporary Perspectives on International Law: History, Culture,
and International Law, 355 COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACAD. OF INT’L L. 41, 90 (2011)
(footnote omitted) (quoting H.E. Wen Jiabao, Premier of the State Council of the People’s Republic of
China, Statement at the General Debate of the 63rd Session of the U.N. General Assembly 3 (Sept. 24,
2008), http://www.un.org/ga/63/generaldebate/pdf/china_en.pdf).
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Thus, for China, the principle of sovereignty is paramount. As China’s
then-President Hu Jintao stated in his remarks at the Second Round of the
China-U.S. Strategic and Economic Dialogue, “sovereignty, independence,
and territorial integrity are a country’s most basic rights recognized by the
norms governing international relations. To the Chinese people, nothing is
more important than safeguarding national sovereignty and territorial
integrity.”25
China’s emphasis on the inviolability of sovereignty was echoed by
newly independent states in the era of decolonization following World War
II. Despite China’s economic growth and global prominence, many of its
leaders and scholars still consider it to be a developing country.26 Thus,
China has continued to associate itself with newly independent states like
India and has shared its commitment to sovereign equality and
independence under international law with those states.
1. China’s Adherence to Absolute Sovereign Immunity
Given the Chinese government’s repeated, continuous emphasis on
sovereignty, it is not surprising that China has also “consistently upheld the
principle of State immunity for the maintenance of legal order and the
stability of international relations.”27 Summarizing China’s state practice,
leading Chinese international scholar (and current ICJ member) Xue
Hanqin stated:
[China] holds absolute immunity in case of acts of foreign States from
national jurisdiction and execution. It is of the view that the principle of
immunity is a right of State under customary international law rather
than [of] comity. . . . In its judicial practice, Chinese national courts have
neither exercised jurisdiction over acts of foreign States, nor have they
enforced any decisions involving public property of foreign States.28

China has linked its adherence to the doctrine of absolute sovereign
immunity to the principle of sovereign equality. Despite the strong
international trend toward a restrictive theory of immunity,29 China has
maintained its commitment to absolute immunity. For instance, in a U.S.
25. President Hu Jintao, Address at the Second Round of the China-U.S. Strategic and Economic
Dialogue (May 24, 2010), http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/xw/t696949.htm.
26. See Bing Bing Jia, A Synthesis on the Notion of Sovereingyty and the Ideal of the Rule of
Law: Reflections on the Contemporary Chiense Approach to International Law, 53 GERMAN
YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 11, 20 n. 49 and 52 (2010).
27. Hanqin, supra note 24, at 100.
28. Id. at 100–01 (citing INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CHINA: CASES AND PRACTICE 35 (Duan Jie
Long ed., 2011 [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CHINA]).
29. Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 319 (2010).
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case involving creditors seeking to enforce defaulted Chinese government
bonds in U.S. courts, the government of China sent an aide memoire to the
U.S. government demanding full immunity even though its bond sales were
commercial activities not normally granted immunity.30 In this aidememoire, China argued that:
[T]he absolute jurisdictional immunity of States in foreign courts is still
a valid rule under international law on the basis of the principle of
sovereign equality (par in parem non habet imperium, an equal has no
power over an equal). So far there has not been enough evidence to
prove that by State practice and opinio juris, this customary international
law rule has changed.31

It is worth noting that China’s position in favor of absolute immunity
appears driven by concerns over the arbitrary and inconsistent application
of the restrictive theory. As Wang Houli, the leading international lawyer
serving in China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, explained in 1987:
[I]t is China’s view that the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity,
characterized by classification of state acts into those which are
“sovereign” and “non-sovereign,” is theoretically unfounded. States, as
sovereign entities, by definition behave in the capacity of sovereigns. It
is erroneous to assume that states have dual and different identities.
Moreover, the distinction between the two kinds of state acts is hardly
workable in practice because it lacks consistency and precision in
content, and it provides no common criterion for differentiation.32

When China signed the 2004 Convention on the Jurisdictional Immunities
of States (which follows the restrictive approach), Chinese scholars hailed
China’s abandonment of its absolute immunity position. But China never
ratified the Convention, nor has that Convention come into force due to the
small number of countries that have ratified it. Still, it was somewhat
surprising when the Chinese government reaffirmed its adherence to the
absolute immunity position in 2011.
In Democratic Republic of Congo v. FG Hemisphere Associates,33 the
Chinese government required Hong Kong courts to abandon the restrictive
30. Aide Memoire from Wu Xuequian, Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, to George Shultz,
U.S. Secretary of State (Feb. 10, 1983), reprinted in 22 INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 81, 81 (1983).
31. Hanqin, supra note 24, at 102 (citing INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CHINA, supra note 28, at 36).
32. Wang Houli, Sovereign Immunity: Chinese Views and Practices, 1 J. CHINESE L. 23, 29
(1987).
33. Democratic Republic of the Congo v. FG Hemisphere Assocs., [2011] 14 H.K.C.F.A.R. 395,
¶¶ 62, 502–12 (C.F.A.) (H.K.).
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theory that had been in effect during the British period, and to grant
sovereign immunity to a foreign state involved in a commercial dispute
with private creditors.34 Thus, China today appears to have continued to
endorse absolute immunity.
2. Foreign Government Official Immunity and the Jus cogens
Exception
Like most states, China roots the immunity of its government officials
in the sovereign immunity enjoyed by foreign states. Chinese government
officials have faced several lawsuits in U.S. courts under the Alien Tort
Statute. This U.S. law has been used by Chinese nationals to sue Chinese
government officials for alleged complicity in torture and other human
rights abuses.35 In such lawsuits filed against Chinese government officials,
the Chinese government has not participated in the litigation by appearing
in court. Instead, the Chinese government has demanded that the U.S.
government block the lawsuit based on the sovereign immunity due to
Chinese officials.36 Such demands were not affected by the fact that the
government officials were accused of jus cogens violations.37
The Chinese government’s filings on behalf of its then-Minister of
Commerce Bo Xilai in 2006 revealed how China reacted to a lawsuit
against its government officials. In Li Weixum v. Bo Xilia, a Falun Gong
practitioner, alleged that Bo had authorized the torture of Falun Gong
practitioners in China.38 Bo was served with papers during his participation
in a U.S. government sponsored conference on U.S.-China trade.39 In the
position paper that it sent to the U.S. Department of State explaining the
basis for its demand for action, the Chinese government invoked sovereign
immunity for Bo, noting that the doctrine is a “universally recognized norm
of international law.”40 Despite the allegations of jus cogens violations, the

34. Id.; see also Yilin Ding, Absolute, Restrictive, or Something More: Did Beijing Choose the
Right Type of Sovereign Immunity for Hong Kong?, 26 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 997, 997–98 (2012).
35. See, e.g., Plaintiffs A, B, C, D, E, F v. Jiang Zemin, 282 F. Supp. 2d 875, 879 (N.D. Ill.
2003), aff'd sub nom. Wei Ye v. Jiang Zemin, 383 F.3d 620 (7th Cir. 2004).
36. See, e.g., Yelin, supra note 5, at 924 (describing a U.S. State Department letter stating that the
Chinese government had asked the U.S. government to act).
37. See Li Weixum v. Bo Xilai, 568 F. Supp. 2d 35, 36 (D.D.C. 2008).
38. Id. at 36 n. 2.
39. Id. at 36.
40. Position of the Chinese Government on the Assault and Attempted Frame-up by “Falun
Gong” Against Minister Bo Xilai 17, transmitted by Letter from Liu Zhenmin, Dir. Gen. of the Chinese
Dep’t of Treaty & Law, to William Taft, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State (Aug. 23, 2004),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/98830.pdf.
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government warned that failure to dismiss the case could seriously harm
U.S.-China relations.41
Although the jus cogens exception was not considered in the Chinese
statement in the Weixum v. Bo case, Chinese scholars have noted the trend
toward lifting sovereign immunity protections for international jus cogens
violations.42 Not surprisingly, Chinese scholars have been critical of this
approach, at least with respect to state criminal jurisdiction.43 In lauding the
ICJ’s decision in the Arrest Warrant case, Judge Xue stated that “the legal
certainty [provided] by distinguishing the immunity rule from substantive
law . . . is conducive to the development of international humanitarian law
and human rights law,”44 but simultaneously preserves the immunity
principle that “touches on the foundation of the State system and
fundamental principles of international law: sovereign equality and noninterference.”45
It is worth noting that Chinese scholars and officials have aimed their
criticism at individual states exercising criminal jurisdiction for jus cogens
violations, rather than at international organizations. Thus, the Chinese
representative at the 63rd Session of the General Assembly’s Sixth
Committee addressed the work of a special rapporteur on foreign
government official immunity and noted that:
[I]mmunity from foreign State criminal jurisdiction and criminal
jurisdiction of international judicial institutions are two distinct legal
issues. . . . [T]he fact that one State establishes jurisdiction over certain
crimes under international law doesn’t imply that foreign State officials
automatically lose their immunity in relation to such crimes in the
domestic court of the said state. . . . [E]xceptions to immunity of State
officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction have the potential to be
abused and misused as a tool for politically motivated prosecution. And
in such an event, it will . . . lose its usefulness in fighting crimes and
protecting human rights . . . .46
41. Id. at 20.
42. 李损, Li Sun 论政府官员在国家豁免中的地位问题 [On the Status of Government Officials
Under State Immunity]， 法法法法法 [Legal System and Society](May 2010) (noting the international
trend toward greater limitations on government officials’ exercise of sovereign immunity with respect
to private actions, violations of domestic law, and violations of international crimes).
43. Wang Xiumei, The Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction, 30 J. OF
XIAN JIAOTONG UNIV. 67 (2010).
44. Hanqin, supra note 24, at 103.
45. Id.
46. Liu Zhenmin, Deputy Permanent Representative of China to the U.N., Statement at the Sixth
Committee of the 63rd Session of the U.N. General Assembly, on Item 75: Report of the International
Law Commission on the Work of its 60th Session (Nov. 3, 2008), http://www.china-un.org/eng/hyyfy/
t520980.htm.
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China’s representative criticized the way in which some states have
manipulated immunity exceptions, a practice which will “have a serious
impact on stable relations among states.”47
In other words, China’s objection to the jus cogens exception to
sovereign immunity lies not in a belief that international crimes are not
serious or deserving of punishment. Rather, its objection is to the
possibility that individual states might abuse domestic judicial processes
and undermine China’s sovereign independence and equality. Such crimes
would, presumably, be more appropriately handled at the international level
by an international court. This position was confirmed by a Chinese
delegate’s recent remarks to the General Assembly’s Sixth Committee
during a discussion on universal jurisdiction:
The Chinese delegation wishes to reiterate that a state must strictly
follow international law in establishing and exercising universal
jurisdiction. With the exception of piracy, there exist currently notable
differences and controversies among member states on whether universal
jurisdiction exists in other cases and on its scope and application
conditions.48

Thus, “[i]n the absence of an international consensus on the definition,
scope, and application of universal jurisdiction, states should refrain from
going beyond the current international law and seeking to unilaterally claim
and exercise universal jurisdiction not explicitly permitted by the current
international law.”49
This position may or may not be persuasive. But it is a good faith
defense of sovereign immunity, even for jus cogens violations, rooted in
China’s historical insistence on sovereign equality and independence. It is
not merely a matter of political expediency or even pure ideology. As
Judge Xue explains,
China reserves its position on the principles of sovereignty and noninterference, because it believes that sovereignty, in the final analysis, is
not so much about the concept itself . . . ; it is a claim about the way in
which how different political and social systems, different forms of

47. Id.
48. Zhou Wu, Chinese Delegate to the U.N., Statement at the 70th Session of the U.N. General
Assembly on Agenda Item 86: The Scope and Application of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction
(Oct. 20, 2015), http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/legalaffairs/sixthcommittee1/t1307695.htm.
49. Id.
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civilization and culture should correlate and treat each other in
international relations.50

CONCLUSION: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CHINA’S REJECTION OF
THE JUS COGENS EXCEPTION TO SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
When it concluded that international law recognizes a jus cogens
exception to sovereign immunity, the Fourth Circuit considered various
international sources. It did not, however, consider China’s views on the
issue. This is understandable given the lack of Chinese judicial authority on
the question. But as this Essay has demonstrated, China’s long-standing
“enthusiasm” for sovereign equality has led China to adopt the broadest,
most absolutist form of sovereign immunity doctrine imaginable. This
position rejects restrictive immunity for commercial activities and would
reject a jus cogens exception to sovereign immunity for the same reasons.
Allowing a departure from absolute sovereign immunity, in the eyes of the
current Chinese government, would undermine China’s hard-won
sovereign equality and independence.
But do China’s views on this question matter? While China is a rising
global power, it is not yet clear that China’s views can overcome the strong
trend in the U.S. and Europe in the opposite direction. At the same time,
the different reaction of the U.S. government to the Samantar case versus
prior Chinese government official cases is instructive. In Samantar, the
U.S. government actually determined that Samantar should not receive
immunity because, among other things, the current government of Somalia
did not acknowledge responsibility for his alleged acts. As Somalia did not
have a single government at that time and had been in and out of civil war
for decades, the U.S. did not have to fear negative repercussions in foreign
relations.
China is a different story. From the Huguang railway bonds case in the
early 1980s to the Bo ATS lawsuit in 2006, China has consistently
demanded immunity for its government officials from any and all U.S.
litigation. While the U.S. government’s executive cannot force courts to
adopt China’s absolutist view of sovereign immunity outside of the head of
state context, the U.S. did find ways to achieve China’s goals through other
legal doctrines. One would expect the U.S. government to find similar legal
loopholes in future cases, but it is possible that a Chinese government
official could again be subject to a lawsuit for alleged jus cogens violations.
Could the U.S. (with China’s criticism ringing in its ears) really allow a
court to lift China’s immunity for actions of its government officials?

50. Hanqin, supra note 24, at 106.
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If China’s views were taken seriously, courts in the U.S. might be
much less likely to find the existence of an international law consensus on
the jus cogens exception. China opposes a jus cogens exception, and it
maintains a robust and absolute conception of sovereignty. This insistence
suggests that a global consensus on a jus cogens exception to sovereign
immunity may remain out of reach, despite the contrary conclusions
reached by the Fourth Circuit and numerous scholars.

